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ABSTRACT
The pandemic brought to the fore the long-standing weaknesses of
resolving countries’ debt repayment difficulties. This article examines
the response by the G20 and the IMF in the first six months of the
pandemic focusing on low-income countries. This article maps the
proposals and current debate motivated by the pandemic and
argues that a critical element of the dysfunctional architecture that
deserves more attention is Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). The
article analyses the characteristics of IMF loans to DSSI eligible
countries, and scrutinises the IMF’s loan approval basis. The article
finds that programmes were approved on the basis of sharp “V”
shaped recovery and re-establishment of fiscal austerity after
transitory deficit spending. As a consequence of the problems in
international sovereign debt architecture, the IMF and G20 have
provided piecemeal policies to address the unfolding crisis. The
article suggests the problem of DSA is symptomatic of its fraught
origin and concludes that along with existing proposals to improve
sovereign debt architecture, the alternatives for a more suitable
economic analysis ought to be revisited.
RÉSUMÉ
La pandémie de COVID-19 a révélé les difficultés qui depuis longtemps
freinent le remboursement des dettes nationales. Cet article étudie la
réponse du G20 et du FMI lors des six premiers mois de la
pandémie, se concentrant plus spécifiquement sur les pays à faible
revenu. Il retrace les différentes propositions et les points forts du
débat actuel sur la pandémie, et suggère qu’une attention
particulière devrait être prêtée à l’Analyse de la Viabilité de la Dette
(AVD), car il s’agit d’une caractéristique essentielle de ce système
dysfonctionnel. Cet article analyse les caractéristiques des prêts
offerts aux pays éligibles DSSI, et interroge les critères d’approbation
de prêt du FMI, révélant que des programmes furent approuvés du
simple fait de leur rapide reprise en « V », et de la réinstauration de
l’austérité financière après une phase transitoire de dépenses
publiques. En conséquence de cette faille dans le système
international de dette souveraine, le FMI et le G20 ont adopté des
politiques fragmentaires en réponse à la crise actuelle. Cet article
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suggère que le problème de l’AVD est symptomatique de la tourmente
de son contexte d’origine, et il conclut qu’au-delà des propositions
existantes pour améliorer le système de dette souveraine, il est
nécessaire de revisiter d’autres méthodes d’analyse économique plus
adaptées à la situation.
Introduction
The pandemic is having a severe social, humanitarian, and economic impact in developing
countries. Deep recessions, disruption from trade and declines in key commodity prices are
coupled with a rapid reversal of capital flows and depreciating currencies. Health care costs
are increasing, which in many countries pale in comparison to amounts spent on public debt
service (Abiy 2020). This is pushing millions more into extreme poverty (Alston 2020;
Summer, Hoy and Ortiz-Juarez 2020), unemployment (ILO 2020) and the risk of famine
(WFP 2020). The impact of the pandemic, and the deficiencies of the Global Financial
Safety Net in providing low- and middle-income countries with access to needed liquidity
(Stubbs et al. 2021), have brought a new debt crisis to the centre stage. Growing debt vulner-
abilities have been a growing concern for years (Bonizzi, Laskaridis, and Toporowski 2019,
2020; IMF 2018a; UNCTAD 2016), but reflect long-standing, structural inequalities in the
global economy (Geda 2003; Laskaridis 2021b; Shola Omotola and Saliu 2009). The pan-
demic has forcefullymade governments choose between necessarymeasures to protect popu-
lations and economies, and keeping up with debt service payments.
As debt repayment problems are exacerbated, the long-standing weaknesses of addressing
sovereign debt crises have reappeared. What happens when countries find themselves in debt
repayment difficulties? Countries face an amalgam of creditors’ forums and disparate legal
environments; they face exclusion from capital markets, risk creditor litigation, while forced
to abandon development plans often alongside contractionary IMF programmes that fail to
provide equitable and long-lasting solutions to debt problems (United Nations 2011). As
widely acknowledged, debt crises are dealt with in ways characterised by “too little, too
late”, frequently failing to re-establish debt sustainability, and at great social cost for the
debtor country (Barry, Herman, and Tomitova 2007; Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz 2016).
While it is too early to provide a full assessment, this article examines the initial policy
response by the IMF and the G20, and contextualises the response within the inter-
national debt architecture. First, we introduce the main features of the IMF’s and
G20’s policy response over the course of the first six months of the pandemic, and
maps the state of the debate surrounding alternative policy proposals. We then move
onto an examination of key trends in the policy initiatives by the IMF and the G20
and an examination of the recent debt sustainability assessments underpinning the
IMF’s loan financing. Finally, we contextualise the problems of the response in light of
the gap in international debt architecture and revisit the needed alternatives.
Mapping the policy response
A summary of the IMF and G20 schemes
The IMF and G20 introduced three main policy measures in the first six months of the
pandemic. The IMF scaled up to two financing facilities, the non-concessional Rapid
CJDS / LA REVUE 201
Financing Instrument (RFI) and concessional Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), enabling
rapid dispersion of loans without the need for negotiated upper-credit tranche pro-
grammes (IMF 2020e), and revived a facility, the CCRT, for debt-service relief (IMF
2020h). As a result of this expeditious process, there has been a rapid increase in
financing, across regions, facilities, and income groups, analysed in Stubbs (2021).1
The G20 inaugurated the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in April to support
“a time-bound suspension of debt service payments for the poorest countries that request
forbearance”, covering both principal repayments and interest payments falling due to
official bilateral creditors during the suspension period (G20 2020a). There has been
no enforcement of private creditor participation. The countries eligible for this initiative
are those eligible for International Development Association (IDA) borrowing and those
defined as Least Developed Countries (LDC) by the United Nations, which are current on
debt service to the IMF and theWorld Bank. There are 77 countries that were categorised
as IDA or LDC at the time of the DSSI launch, but only 73 are eligible to participate due
to protracted arrears by four countries.2 Four conditions need to be fulfilled for countries
to participate in the DSSI: IMF financing or request for financing must be in place; the
resources freed must be used for pandemic-response and will be monitored by the Inter-
national Financial Institutions (IFIs); participation necessitates detailed disclosure on
public sector borrowing bar commercially sensitive information; and finally, new bor-
rowing during this period must comply with the IMF’s Debt Limit Policy (DLP) and
the World Bank’s policy on non-concessional borrowing (G20 2020a). The terms of
reference for the scheme stated that any suspended debt repayment must be repaid
within three years following the one-year grace period, making any deferred payments
due over 2022-2024. The DSSI can be implemented through rescheduling or refinancing
on NPV-neutral terms. NPV neutrality entails that this postponement of payments pro-
vides no relief and involves no creditor loss. It is a voluntary initiative, and while Stan-
dard and Poor’s have indicated that application to the DSSI would not be viewed
negatively, Moody’s have differed stating that applying to the scheme raises the prospect
for subsequent private creditor loss (White and Case 2020), and have downgraded or
placed on review for downgrade several countries (Moody’s 2020a, 2020b).
The G20 called on private creditors to participate in the scheme on comparable terms
and multilateral development banks to encourage their support while not jeopardising
their rating (G20 2020a). The industry body – the Institute of International Finance
(IIF) – published suggestive terms of reference for its participation in May (IIF 2020).
Taking a harder stance than bilateral creditors, the IIF stated that forbearance on its
own is NPV negative, thus any participation must come with financial benefit and
credit enhancements (Adams 2020b; IIF 2020). Despite claiming to take principles of
NPV neutrality into account, the IIF’s proposal increases the owed amount to participat-
ing countries by applying interest on the deferred amount. 3
Reactions and alternatives to the policy response
As economic conditions deteriorated and policies were rolled out, a plethora of sup-
plementary and alternative proposals emerged to mitigate the unfolding debt crisis.
Much of the debate focused on how to expand the suspension offered by the G20 and
broaden the spectrum of creditors involved. As the DSSI focuses on only a small
segment of debt service due, the exclusion of private creditors drew widespread criticisms.
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Making use of contractual provisions in bond contracts to operationalise a broader stand-
still was suggested byGelpern,Hagan, andMazarei (2020) andBuchheit andHagan (2020),
and private creditor participation could be implemented through the proposal by Bolton
et al. (2020), who suggested that a multilateral development bank (MDB) create a
central credit facility (CCF) for each country. Debtor governments seeking to participate
would notify creditors that payments coming due during the standstill period would be
made to the facility, which would initially fund crisis response measures and later be
used to repay creditors who would receive a corresponding credit in the CCF by the cor-
responding amount.4 While they suggested that a MDB ensures any drawings are used
solely for crisis amelioration, and that private creditors could potentially enhance their
claims through the co-mingling of funds with multilateral development funds that are
de facto senior, this must be weighed against the fact that MDBs are creditor institutions,
which are simultaneously resisting their inclusion in the DSSI (see for instance Malpass
2020b). Leaving the World Bank and IMF as chief arbiters of any scheme would fall
short of the needed neutrality and confidence, given their track record of conditionality
programmes that are responsible for the structurally weak, underfunded health systems
(Kentikelenis et al. 2020; Ortiz and Stubbs 2020) that theDSSI aims to succour. An alterna-
tive suggestion to bind private-sector creditors to a standstill was put forward through
operationalising a little-known section of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (Article VIII,
Section 2 (b)). Most recently put forward by Munevar and Pustovit (2020), the use of
this article has been raised in the past as a means to impose standstills on private creditors.
It relies on the IMF approving restrictions on international transactions, preventing enfor-
ceability of debt contracts in IMF members’ domestic courts. While frequently debated at
several junctures over the past decades, the Article has never been used for this purpose.
The aforementioned proposals would be cumbersome and remain open to the possi-
bility of creditor litigation. Several outstanding bonds issued by low-income developing
countries contain the first generation of collective action clauses (CACs) (Bonizzi, Laskar-
idis, and Griffiths 2020),5 are prone to holdouts, and as a result, the pandemic reinvigorated
proposals to deal with preventing legal challenges. While these proposals do not offer debt
relief, as the proceedings a creditor may bring are delayed not annulled, they offer protec-
tion to debtor states during a crisis. For the CCF above, Bolton et al. (2020) suggest that – if
pursued – an official body, such as the G20, could pronounce that official sectors and
debtors are acting out of necessity with reference to Article 25(1) of the Articles on State
Responsibility. National statutory legislation could also constrain the ability of creditors
from bringing lawsuits. In the UK, this proposal was advocated by civil society organis-
ations (Jubilee Debt Campaign 2020) and prompted legal commentary to thoroughly
develop a national statutory proposal (Connelly et al. 2020). The proposal aims to
prevent private creditors holding English law bonds, which most low-income countries
issue, from pursuing legal proceedings during the moratorium period.6 Similarly, Buchheit
and Hagan (2020), suggested an “international equivalent of a temporary moratorium on
mortgage foreclosures”, permitting judges to halt lawsuits against countries by amending
sovereign immunity laws in the US and the UK. Several suggestions have been made to
protect the assets of the countries that face litigation along the lines of the UN National
Security Council’s creation of “worldwide legal immunity” over Iraq’s oil assets (Buchheit
and Hagan 2020; Gelpern, Hagan, and Mazarei 2020).
The debate illustrates the dissatisfactions towards the existent policy response that arise
as a consequence of the lack of an overarching, comprehensive approach. Even though
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Buchheit and Hagan (2020, 3) and Bolton et al. (2020, 6) suggested that there was little
political enthusiasm to revisit the debate, nor the time to design and implement any insti-
tutional solution, a plethora of proposals for institutional coordination far beyond what
the DSSI or any augmentation can achieve have been vocally put forward. The discussion
on soft-law principles – voluntary and non-binding agreements that have been developed
by several institutions, have come to the fore (see UNDESA 2020). Market-based propo-
sals such as debt swaps have also been raised, taking their cue from past debt-to-health and
debt-to-climate swaps (Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development 2020;
United Nations Secretary General 2020), as have financing instruments such as state-con-
tingent debt instruments that would conserve fiscal space in times of crisis (see Gelpern,
Hagan, and Mazarei 2020). Short of a fully blown statutory mechanism, some degree of
coordination and shepherding is proposed by Gelpern, Hagan, and Mazarei (2020) in
the form of a Sovereign Debt Coordination Group set up by the G20, and by UN
DESA, in the form of a Sovereign Debt Forum, to provide a platform for creditors and
debtors to discuss debt relief in the context of meeting SDG goals (UNDESA 2020).
Beyond this though, immediate and drastic debt relief, as well as systemic and insti-
tutional debt resolution mechanisms have been called for. Intergovernmental organis-
ations, national leaders, academics, and civil society organisations have emphasised
comprehensive and immediately instituted debt standstills on repayments, as well as
debt relief initiatives, alongside proposals for large and immediate stimulus packages.
In March 2020 African ministers called for $44 billion earmarked for debt waivers on
all interest payments of public debt (UNECA 2020) and the United Nations General Sec-
retary called on the G20 to include standstills for all creditors for 2020 (Guterres 2020).
National leaders have widely raised the issue of debt relief. Ecuador’s Congress called on
the government to suspend debt payments to all lenders to free up resources needed for
addressing the pandemic (Kueffner and Bartenstein 2020). The Prime Minister of Paki-
stan and of Ethiopia urged for debt relief for all developing countries (Peshiman 2020;
Taylor 2020) and in mid-May, US Senator Sanders and Member of the Congress
Omar led a global call signed by more than 300 parliamentarians to support debt cancel-
lation for IDA countries (Omar and Sanders 2020). Civil society and workers’ organis-
ations across the globe have sustained political pressure in favour of debt cancellation
through far-reaching global campaigns (for instance see CADTM 2020; Progressive
International 2020; Ravenscroft 2020), with Germany’s post war cancellation suggested
as a benchmark (Ghosh 2020; UNCTAD 2020b). The urgency for a coordinated
approach to the debt crisis was resolutely put forward by UNCTAD, for an International
Developing Country Debt Authority to oversee comprehensive temporary standstills,
Debt Sustainability Analyses (DSAs) and consequent debt relief (UNCTAD 2020a).
The UN Secretary General’s proposal also involved the transformation of international
debt architecture to develop a comprehensive framework for debt restructurings. Such
proposals are supported by the global call by CSO’s (see Ravenscroft 2020).
As stated by UN DESA “Without aggressive policy action, the COVID-19 pandemic
could turn into a protracted debt crisis for many developing countries” (UNDESA 2020,
1). For this reason, three main policy recommendations would constitute an improve-
ment to existing policies. First, immediate debt and condition-free financing. The IMF
and UNCTAD have highlighted that developing countries face a 2.5 trillion USD
financing gap (IMF 2020c; UNCTAD 2020a) and yet initial assessments find that
204 C. LASKARIDIS
developing countries’ access to needed liquidity is severely constrained (Gallagher et al.
2020; Stubbs et al. 2021).7 Second, immediate debt relief to address short-term liquidity
pressures, and medium-term sustainability problems, with an estimated required debt
relief at 1 trillion USD (UNCTAD 2020b). This should cover all creditors and all
countries that need it (Ghosh 2020; United Nations Secretary General 2020), including
countries not eligible for the DSSI, such as middle-income countries, some of which
spend over 20% of government revenue on debt service (Okonjo-Iweala et al. 2020).
Third, comprehensive creditor participation and neutral assessments of needed relief
require an independent body to undertake meaningful sustainability assessments,
oversee comprehensive standstills and manage restructurings. These proposals could
be taken forward through a “Global Debt Deal” (UNCTAD 2020a).
The response to the unfolding debt crisis: key trends
Against this backdrop, we trace the key characteristics of the policy response. Overall, in
the first six months of the pandemic, the IMF approved over 88 billion USD to 85
countries, across all facilities. Over the same period, the two enlarged loan facilities –
RCF and RFI – financed 69 countries over 29 billion USD. With respect to DSSI eligi-
bility, a summary of RCF and RFI financing is shown in Table 1. The majority of
financing has been non-concessional (21.7 billion USD) as opposed to concessional
(7.4 billion USD), and DSSI eligible countries have received just over half of their IMF
financing on non-concessional terms.
A total of 48 DSSI eligible countries received RFI and RCF financing up to August
2020, some of which were funded from both facilities: 7.1 billion USD in concessional
loans and 7.6 billion USD in non-concessional loans. This is summarised in Table 2.
The IMF repurposed one of its trust structures to finance debt service relief, but priori-
tised non-concessional new financing to the detriment of grant financing. On April 13th,
the IMF announced it would use money in the Catastrophe Containment and Relief
Trust (CCRT) to provide grant financing for the debt service falling due on IMF loans
over the next six months (IMF 2020h). Despite recent pledges by governments to
support this fund (such as the UK (IMF 2020a), its resources are limited. The initial
package from the CCRT amounted to approximately 215 million USD debt service
relief for 25 countries growing only slightly since. All recipients are DSSI eligible
countries. While an important move in the right direction, there are several limitations.
Table 1. Total RCF and RFI Loans approved by IMF by Region and DSSI Eligibility, Billion USD, March –
August 2020.





DSSI Eligible Not DSSI Eligible DSSI Eligible
Emerging and developing Asia 1.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.8
Emerging and developing Europe 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.0 1.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.2 4.7 0.0 4.7 4.9
Middle East and Central Asia 0.8 3.9 1.8 5.7 6.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.3 4.7 4.7 9.5 14.8
Grand Total 7.4 14.1 7.6 21.7 29.1
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank (2020a) and IMF Monitor (2020).
Note: Loans from other facilities, including funds committed prior to the pandemic are not included but can be found in
Stubbs et al. (2021).
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The use of the CCRT is limited in scope supporting only a fraction of the debt service
to the IMF that DSSI countries will make over the next six months. Countries that benefit
from the CCRT will continue to make principal payments to the Fund (111 million USD
in principal repayments between July and the end of 2020), while DSSI eligible countries
that have been excluded from this initiative will make a total projected principal and
interest repayments to the Fund of 1.05 billion USD over the same period.8 Second,
while funding debt service relief is a welcome measure, these funds end up in the
IMF’s coffers, not the country’s. It may not clearly be a net gain for developing countries
as there is a concern that the donations going into the CCRT pot could be repurposing
aid funds (Munevar 2020).
The creditor composition for DSSI eligible countries shows that the G20 initiative
addresses just a fraction of outstanding obligations (Figure 1 in nominal values). DSSI
countries, on aggregate, owe 38% of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external
debt to bilateral creditors, 41% to multilateral creditors and 21% to private creditors
(World Bank 2020a).9
Table 2. IMF financing and DSSI eligible countries.
IMF Financing to DSSI Eligible Countries, March to August 2020, Billion USD
Grant financing (CCRT) 0.25
Concessional (RCF) 7.36
Non-Concessional (RFI) 7.59
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank (2020a) and IMF Monitor (2020).
Figure 1. Creditor Composition of External Public and Publicly Guaranteed (PPG) Debt Stocks for DSSI
Eligible Countries, shares and Billion USD, 2018.
Source: Author’s Calculation based on World Bank (2020a).
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The total debt service payments that DSSI eligible countries are due to pay in 2020 is 42.7
billion USD of which 17.4 billion USD on bilateral debt – the debt covered by the DSSI
(World Bank 2020c). If this is adjusted to account only for the period that the first phase
of the DSSI covered (May to December), the maximum amount of potential debt service
relief that the DSSI could cover is 11.5 billion USD (World Bank 2020c). This amount is
not only underwhelming when compared to the degree of relief that is needed, it is also
underwhelming as only a fraction has been delivered. As of July 2020, 41 out of 73 eligible
countries have participated, potentially covering 8.7 billion USD of debt service (World
Bank 2020c). The July 18th G20 Communique stated that even less has been delivered:
deferred repayments to date are 5.3 billion USD (G20 2020b). However, as seen in Figure
2, the majority of debt service payments due in 2020 are not eligible for DSSI relief.
In summary, the DSSI could offer up to 11.5 billion USD if implemented in full, but
less than half has been delivered months after its inception. Even if implemented in its
entirety, the breathing space created would be partial, as most of the debt repayments
due are not covered, and any temporary breathing space offered by the IMF’s emergency
financing and DSSI would only ease the repayment of non-participating creditors. The
initiatives are limited and expensive; the voluntary aspect of the DSSI means that debt
service relief is partial and delivery shorter than what is called for.
IMF loan financing, DSSI and risk of debt distress
The IMF and World Bank reiterated that they should be tasked with identifying unsus-
tainable debt situations (e.g. in Malpass 2020a). This section examines the 39 DSAs
Figure 2. Debt Service Payments in 2020 by DSSI Eligible Countries, billion USD. Source: Author’s cal-
culation based on World Bank (2020a).
Note: The taxonomy of creditors provided by the World Bank for DSSI reporting includes four categories. The Non-official
category includes all other private creditors, such as commercial bank loans and loans covered by an export credit guar-
antee (World Bank, n.d.).
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released between March and August 2020 for DSSI eligible countries that received emer-
gency IMF financing. Like the framework developed for countries with significant market
access, the low-income country framework includes projected debt dynamics under base-
line and stress tests scenarios, but unlike the market access framework, assessments
include an explicit risk rating of the likelihood of debt distress that arises from specific
thresholds that are determined, inter alia, by a controversial measure of a country’s
debt carrying capacity (Nissanke and Ferrarini 2004; Van Waeyenberge 2007). As
shown in Figure 3, of the loans provided up to August 2020, 34% have gone to countries
assessed as being in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress. Several countries assessed
as being at moderate risk of debt distress and one in high are nevertheless lent to on non-
concessional terms.
Two out of the five indicators that inform the risk of debt distress are the PPG debt
service ratio as a share of exports and government revenues. Across the range of debt-
carrying capacities, breaches to sustainability are assumed to occur at 10-21% of
exports, and 14–23% of revenue (IMF 2018b). Figure 4 plots these two indicators,
along with the risk of debt distress and DSSI participation up to August 2020.10 A
cluster of countries spend over 10% of government revenue on debt service and 15%
of export income. Participation in the DSSI has taken place across the range of debt
service burdens that countries face, with participation ranging from low shares of debt
service to exports, up to 26% in Cameroon. Several countries have not yet participated
that have high debt service-to-revenue and export indicators, such as Kenya and
Ghana. With respect to the risk of debt distress, countries with burdensome debt indi-
cators, assessed as being at high risk had not, in the first 6 months of the pandemic par-
ticipated in the scheme. Others, with relatively lower debt service burdens also assessed as
being at high risk have not yet received the temporary relief through the DSSI. Existing
problems are thus reinforced by further loans from the IMF and a repayment postpone-
ment without relief.
Looking further into the DSAs that these loans were approved on reveals assessments
of debt sustainability that do not adequately assess a country’s ability to service its debt.
There are several issues that make conducting debt sustainability assessment at this
Figure 3. IMF Loan Financing to DSSI Eligible countries according to Risk of Debt Distress, Billion USD,
August 2020.
Note: This does not include grant financing through the CCRT. DSSI eligible countries that do not receive an explicit risk
rating are classed as NA. Source: Author’s calculation from IMF Monitor (2020).
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moment exceptionally difficult and end up aggravating debt repayment difficulties
countries face. Conducting debt sustainability assessments relies heavily on projections
about the future, including the expected path of the global economy, and public and
private debt dynamics. The evolution of the pandemic is still unknown, and the
impact of lockdowns and disruption in economic activity on global growth is still under-
way. Commodity prices such as oil, on which several low-income countries depend also
creates a lot of uncertainty over future income streams. For low-income countries that
rely on development aid, it is still unclear the degree of support that will be sustained
given that the shortfall from OECD countries’ aid commitments over the past decade
stands at approximately 2 trillion USD (UNCTAD (2020b).
Figures 3 and 4 highlight that the IMF’s main response of increased loans leans
towards countries already assessed as being at high risk of debt distress. The assessments
however have not captured the full extent of the problem, and countries are receiving a
“sustainable” label unduly. The pandemic brought upon severe disruption to the financial
markets that was referred to by the IMF as “the largest capital outflow ever recorded”
(IMF 2020b). This led to several sovereign credit downgrades, with FitchRatings
Figure 4. Debt Service Indicators, Risk of Debt Distress and Participation in the DSSI, August 2020.
Source: Author’s calculation based on country level DSAs listed in the Appendix and World Bank (2020a).
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(2020) warning that there may be a record number of defaults in 2020, noting that in the
first four months of 2020, it made a record of 29 downgrades. The distress in financial
markets has had an across the board negative impact on sovereign bond yields (IMF
2020k). As explained in Bonizzi, Laskaridis, and Griffiths (2020) the redemption sche-
dules for many low-income developing countries, including several DSSI eligible
countries that have issued Eurobonds, are bunched beginning in 2023. The amount of
financing these countries will require when these obligations mature is aggravated by
the repayment of the IMF’s non-concessional emergency loans due to begin in mid-
2023, along with the bilateral debt-service payments rescheduled through the DSSI
due over 2022-2024. There can be little confidence in the assumptions that the DSA’s
rely on about the roll over interest rates that would be relevant over the coming years,
the amount of financing that will be available, to which countries, and on what terms.
A similar problem confounds the growth projections. While most of the loan
approvals were announced without accompanying information on the assumptions
that guided the approval (IMF Monitor 2020), subsequent DSAs show that IMF emer-
gency loans have been approved on the basis of favourable growth assumptions.
Figure 5 (panel 1) shows that loan approval is predicated on strong “V” shaped recovery,
with growth, on average, higher in 2021 than in 2019. There is no shortage of evidence
however, that the actual performance of growth in a deep crisis may be dramatically
worse than the IMF’s growth projections (IEO 2014; IMF 2013a). The consequence of
overoptimistic growth projections is to underestimate the severity of a debt crisis and
undermine the needed debt relief.
Equally problematic are the fiscal assumptions underpinning the IMF’s loan approval.
Globally, the scale of fiscal response to the pandemic across income groups has been
unprecedented and far exceeds the measures taken during the global financial crisis
(IMF 2020d). However, this is highly unequal across income groups: while several
high-income countries have announced measures of over 10% of GDP to support
COVID response (and in certain cases, far greater (IMF 2020d)), Sub-Saharan African
Figure 5. Projections underpinning 39 loan approvals to DSSI eligible countries, March – August 2020.
Source: Author’s calculation from the DSAs listed in the Appendix.
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countries have been much more constrained, with the average size of COVID-related
fiscal package around 3 percent of GDP (IMF 2020l). Given the dire outcomes from
COVID-19, the case for “building back better” has included calls for sustained
demand stimulus over the coming period (IMF 2020d; the World Bank 2020b).
However, IMF emergency loans have been approved on the assumption that countries
will implement austerity measures over the years to come (Figure 5, panel 2). Addressing
high debt through fiscal consolidation is ineffective in the best of times (Blyth 2015), but
as austerity worsens growth prospects and has devastating effects on public health
(Amnesty International 2020; Stuckler et al. 2017; UNCTAD 2017), assuming fiscal aus-
terity for loan repayment would be disastrous.
The most important indication of why the DSAs are misguided are that several
countries have already begun to curtail development programmes to adhere to the
debt burden. Recent loan approval documents for Nigeria, Kenya and Cameroon identify
non-priority public investment spending to reduce (IMF 2020i, 2020j, 2020k) showing
that far from sustainable, debt service payments are already being prioritised over
other developmental expenditures. The eligibility criteria on these rapidly disbursing,
low-condition loans are finite (IMF 2020g, 2020f), and as access limits are reached,
countries will move from low-conditionality loans to fully conditional programmes as
indicated in IMF (2020e). Of the DSSI eligible countries receiving IMF emergency
loan finance, at least 14 countries accessed 100% of quota through RCF/RFI by August
2020 (IMF Monitor 2020).
While the problems of conducting DSAs during the pandemic have not gone entirely
unnoticed, they have not received sufficient attention. Gelpern, Hagan, and Mazarei
(2020) recommended “Patience to allow for a more fully informed assessment”, while
calling for a broad standstill on all creditors in the meantime, and Crebo-Rediker and
Rediker (2020) stated that there is no need to judge debts as sustainable when it is more
realistic to say debt prospects are uncertain, stating damages to IMF credibility as a key
reason. They propose that for countries whose sustainability is uncertain, the IMF
should avoid erring on the side of unwarranted optimism and allow low-conditionality
emergency financing to take place without needing strict sustainability requirement.11
DSA and International debt architecture
The DSA has flaws that go beyond the difficulty of making projections in times of uncer-
tainty, and that are intimately linked with how debt crises are addressed. Despite their
prominence, and centrality in debt restructuring (Hagan, 2020), DSAs as a central weak-
nesses of international debt architecture have not received the due importance in the
recent aforementioned debate. The rapid upscale of loans approved on the basis of sus-
tainability, suggests that the problem facing developing countries is being treated as a
short-term balance of payments problem – i.e. a temporary liquidity problem. Such a
reading would exacerbate the possibility that countries are facing a sustainability
problem that would require debt write-down to manageable levels. The World Bank Pre-
sident stated as much, by saying that some IDA countries may need “comprehensive and
fair debt restructuring that includes NPV reductions sufficient for restoring debt sustain-
ability” (Malpass 2020a), and the Common Framework established in November 2020 is
an attempt in this direction.
CJDS / LA REVUE 211
The problems of the DSA are symptomatic of its fraught origin. The DSAwas inaugurated
to guide IMF lending, specifically, to quantify access to extraordinarily large loans (IEO 2016;
Laskaridis 2020; Schadler 2016). After sequential policy failures, the IMF reconfigured the bar
of exceptional access to include a more rigorous assessment of debt sustainability. The reason
was precisely because the Fund was incentivised to provide financing “when prospects for
success are quite poor and debt burden of the sovereign is likely to be unsustainable” (IEO
2016, 18). Initially, DSAs were a means to attempt to provide the needed rigour that was
seen to be lacking from IMF loan approvals, to enhance the credibility of its loan decisions
and ensure greater safeguards over IMF resources.12 Requirements of debt sustainability
were solidified into pre-requisites of IMF financing, and despite the since rescinded amend-
ments to the policy made over the Greek programme in 2010, current policy prohibits loan
approval into situations of unsustainable debt, under both concessional and non-conces-
sional facilities. Assessments of unsustainability require the Fund to seek restructuring or
further concessional financing (IMF 2019). As a key component of programme design,
DSA’s contain the political calculus about who will shoulder the crisis. According to the
IMF, “In principle, assessing whether bringing down debt ratios through a primary adjust-
ment is too costly requires looking at the alternative by evaluating the costs of bringing
down debt ratios through debt restructuring” (IMF, 2011). Asmuch as being about the pro-
jected trajectory of key macroeconomic variables, DSA is about the political calculation of
searching for the adjustment path that lies just shy of halting debt service.
Had past attempts to institute a statutory mechanism for debt resolution been fruitful,
the DSAmay have been destined for a more pivotal role (see Laskaridis, 2020). As indicated
by the Executive Board discussions in the early 2000s, besides guiding IMF policy on access
criteria, DSAs could also define the “need – and scope – of private sector involvement” and
whether an application to the SDRM [Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism] was
justified.13 As is well known, an overarching statutory mechanism was politically
blocked by the United States leading to the increased reliance on a contractual approach
to debt crisis resolution (Gelpern 2016) and efforts to achieve it continued (Li 2015).
Without such amechanism, assuming sustainability when it is lacking repeats IMF policy
failures from the past (IEO, 2004, 2016) and prioritises the repayment of creditors to the
detriment of the needs of the borrowing country (Bantekas and Lumina 2019; United
Nations 2011). Perpetuating potentially unsustainable debt reinforces the evidence that
debt crises are characterised by too little relief, too late (Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz
2016; IMF 2013b), with low-income country debts to foreign private creditors being the
lengthiest to resolve (Wright 2011).When debt restructurings do take place, they are insuffi-
ciently large to guarantee adequate future sustainability, leading to repeat reschedulings
(Guzman 2017), even though greater relief may lead to better outcomes (Reinhart and Tre-
besch 2014). Moreover, in the case of large IMF programmes, these are more successful
when accompanied by debt restructuring (IMF 2019).14 The rapid increase of IMF loans
during the pandemic, in situations where debt repayment prospects are deteriorating,
without insisting on restructuring, enables the use of IMF resources to be used for the servi-
cing of foreign creditors, increases the component of a country’s debt which is owed to the
IMF – a de facto senior creditor that is much harder to restructure – and therefore increases
the depth of a restructuring that may be needed in the future to restore sustainability.
Along with the proposals disused earlier surrounding the urgency for a new sovereign
debt architecture, lies the need for a more suitable concomitant and comprehensive
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economic analysis. Alternatives exist and ought to be revisited. The integration of soft-law
principles, such as the 2015 UNGeneral Assembly’s Principles (Li 2015), into debt sustain-
ability analyses has been argued and promoted broadly (Guzman 2018). This follows from
a long-standing effort, beginning at the first UNCTAD conference in 1964, that sought to
address debt repayment difficulties in the context of achieving development targets, as
opposed to addressing repayment problems as commercial, short-term ventures.15 The
inability of DSAs to adequately safeguard future development plans has led to a resurgence
of efforts to incorporate future financing gaps arising from meeting Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDG) expenditures into calculations of debt sustainability (Inter-Agency Task
Force on Financing for Development 2020; UNDESA 2020; Munevar 2018). Lastly, ensur-
ing debt crises are addressed while respecting human rights obligations, has implications
for the conduct of debt sustainability analyses (Bantekas and Lumina 2019; Bohoslavsky
2016; Lumina 2013). Any of these alternatives would be a huge improvement and
enable fairer and better international debt architecture.
Conclusion
The pandemic highlighted the long-known inability of the existing international debt
architecture to administer the entire universe of creditors, prevent collective action pro-
blems, ensure inter-creditor equity, and most importantly, ensure that debt repayment
difficulties are dealt with rapidly and comprehensively in a way that minimises the
impact on populations in countries in the debt crisis.
This article draws a series of conclusions. First, the article mapped the proposals and
current debate surrounding the resolution of COVID-induced debt crises that have aimed
to suggest improvements to the problematic international architecture, and argued that a
critical element of the dysfunctional architecture that deserves more attention are debt sus-
tainability analyses (DSA). Second, the article offered arguments as to why the first six
months of the initiatives by the IMF and G20 are unsatisfactory. The voluntary aspect of
the DSSI means that debt service relief is partial, favourable to certain creditors, and delivery
is on expensive terms and far less than needed. The article scrutinised the IMF’s loan
approval basis and found that the programmes were approved on the basis of sharp “V”
shaped recovery and re-establishment of fiscal austerity after transitory deficit spending.
Third, the article argued that these problems of DSA are symptomatic of its fraught
origin, and that the DSA is not fit for purpose. Hence, along with existing proposals to
improve sovereign debt architecture, we need to revisit the alternatives for a more suit-
able concomitant and comprehensive economic analysis. Several alternatives exist: inte-
gration of debt sustainability analyses with soft law principles, with sustainable
development goals and within a human rights framework. This would enable a fairer
and better international debt architecture.
Notes
1. Facilities were initially scaled up by increasing their access limits temporarily to 100% of
quota (IMF 2020c). For detailed examination of the IMF response see Stubbs et al.
(2021). Data on the IMF’s response is sourced from a new dataset available on IMF
Monitor (2020) unless stated otherwise.
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2. The IDA countries excluded due to their protracted non-accrual status are Eritrea, Sudan,
Syria, and Zimbabwe.
3. This backtracks from the initial optimistic pronouncements made in early April, where the
IIF President and CEO Timothy Adams supported the calls by the World Bank and IMF on
private creditors to suspend debt payments (Adams 2020a, 2).
4. The authors suggest distinct treatment for interest and principal payments.
5. Newer issuances contain the latest generation of collective action clauses that include single-
limb aggregation.
6. The intention is to mirror, where possible, the UK’s 2010 Debt Relief Act, introduced to
limit the ability of creditors to seek recovery of the full value of debt by countries benefiting
from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
7. On the issue of needing both relief and new financing see Tan (2014).
8. Author’s calculation from the IMF’s Members’ Financial Data tools, available here: https://
www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/index.aspx.
9. Data is sourced from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (The World Bank
2020a). Not all DSSI eligible countries report to the IDS; excluded countries are South
Sudan, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands. Outstanding loans to the
IMF are reported separately to long term external debts and in 2018 amount to 30.5
billion USD (World Bank 2020a).
10. Data is sourced from the 39 individual debt sustainability assessments issued since March
for DSSI eligible countries, listed in the Appendix. In some instances, more than one
DSA was issued since March (Guinea, Rwanda, Papua New Guinea, Myanmar) in which
case only the latest is included.
11. A possible analogy to this proposal could be in line with the European Banking Authority’s
postponement of bank stress testing and capital requirements measures to deal with the pan-
demic (BIS 2020; EBA 2020).
12. For detailed examinations of these points see Laskaridis (2020).
13. Sourced from the IMF Archive: EBM/03/64–July 2, 2003 a.m. Reference: 517552. Board
DOC ID: EBM/03/64–Final. July 2, 2003.
14. For a review of these issues as they relate to the pandemic see Tan (2020).
15. A history of debt sustainability analysis as it developed through the efforts to achieve a fairer
resolution to debt crises can be found in Laskaridis (2021a).
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Appendix. List of consulted Debt Sustainability Analysis documents
Country Date of DSA
1 Burkina Faso DSA: April 25 2020
2 Cabo Verde DSA: April 23 2020
3 Cameroon DSA: June 4 2020
4 Central African Republic DSA: April 28 2020
5 Chad DSA: April 9 2020
6 Côte d’Ivoire DSA: April 23 2020
7 Ethiopia DSA: May 6 2020
8 Gambia, The DSA: April 8 2020
9 Ghana DSA: April 16 2020
10 Grenada DSA: May 13 2020
11 Guinea DSA: July 16 2020
12 Haiti DSA: April 20 2020
13 Honduras DSA: June 3 2020
14 Kenya DSA: May 11 2020
15 Kyrgyz Republic DSA: March 27 2020
16 Liberia DSA: June 12 2020
17 Madagascar DSA: April 10 2020
18 Malawi DSA: May 15 2020
19 Maldives DSA: April 23 2020
20 Mali DSA: May 8 2020
21 Mauritania DSA: April 29 2020
22 Moldova DSA: April 22 2020
23 Mozambique DSA: April 29 2020
24 Myanmar DSA: July 2 2020
25 Nepal DSA: May 11 2020
26 Niger DSA: April 23 2020
27 Papua New Guinea DSA: June 26 2020
28 Rwanda DSA: June 18 2020
29 Samoa DSA: April 28 2020
30 São Tomé and Principe DSA: April 14 2020
31 Senegal DSA: April 16 2020
32 Sierra Leone DSA: June 10 2020
33 Solomon Islands DSA: June 4 2020
34 Somalia DSA: March 12 2020
35 St. Vincent and the Grenadines DSA: May 29 2020
36 Tajikistan DSA: May 7 2020
37 Togo DSA: April 16 2020
38 Uganda DSA: May 14 2020
39 Uzbekistan DSA: May 19 2020
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